\u3cem\u3ePadilla v. Kentucky\u3c/em\u3e and the Evolving Right to Deportation Counsel: Watershed or Work-in-Progress? by Kanstroom, Daniel
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
8-1-2011
Padilla v. Kentucky and the Evolving Right to
Deportation Counsel: Watershed or Work-in-
Progress?
Daniel Kanstroom
Boston College Law School, kanstroo@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination
Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the Immigration Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel Kanstroom. "Padilla v. Kentucky and the Evolving Right to Deportation Counsel: Watershed or Work-in-Progress?." New
England Law Review 45, no.2 (2011): 305-326.
 101  
Padilla  v.  Kentucky  and  the  Evolving  Right  





Though  widely  heralded  by  immigration  and  human  rights  lawyers  as  
a   “landmark,”   possible   “watershed,”   and   even   “Gideon   decision”   for  
immigrants,  Padilla  v.  Kentucky  is  perhaps  better  understood  as  a  Rorschach  
test,  than  as  a  clear  constitutional  precedent.  It   is  surely  a  very  interesting  
and  important  U.S.  Supreme  Court  case   in   the  (rapidly  converging)   fields  
of   immigration   and   criminal   law   in   which   the   Court   struggles   with   the  
functional  relationship  between  ostensibly  “civil”  deportation  proceedings  
and  criminal  convictions.  This  is  a  gratifying  development,  for  reasons  not  
only  of  justice,  fairness,  proportionality,  and  basic  human  decency,  but  also  
(perhaps)   of   doctrinal   consistency.   The   Court’s   choice   to   rely   upon   the  
Sixth   Amendment   is   understandable   and   in   many   respects   salutary.  
However,   this   choice   is   also   in   tension  with   the   civil/criminal  distinction,  
and   it   raises   complex   questions   about   the   process   that   might   be   due  
deportees  both  in  criminal  courts  and  immigration  proceedings.  
  
*    Professor  of  Law  and  Director,  International  Human  Rights  Program,  Boston  College  Law  
School;   LL.M.,   Harvard   University;   J.D.,   Northeastern   University;   B.A.,   State   University   of  
New  York  at  Binghamton.  
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INTRODUCTION  
hough  widely  heralded  by  immigration  and  human  rights  lawyers  as  
a  “landmark,”1  possible  “watershed,”2  and  even  a  “Gideon  decision”  
for  immigrants,3  Padilla  v.  Kentucky4  is  perhaps  better  understood  as  a  
Rorschach   test   than   as   clear   constitutional   precedent.   The   basics   of   the  
holding   are   as   profoundly   important   as   they   are   apparently  
straightforward:   the   U.S.   Supreme   Court   has   held—for   the   first   time   in  
history—that  a  deportee  has  a  Sixth  Amendment  right  to  effective  counsel  
when   deciding  whether   to   plead   guilty   to   a   criminal   offense   that  would  
result  in  deportation.5  That  alone  makes  it  one  of  the  more  interesting  and  
important   Supreme   Court   cases   we   have   ever   seen   in   the   (rapidly  
converging)  fields  of  immigration  and  criminal  law.  Indeed,  it  is  one  of  the  
very  few  times  that  the  Court  has  even  begun  to  grapple  seriously  with  the  
functional  relationship  between  ostensibly  “civil”  deportation  proceedings  
and   criminal   convictions.6   This   is   surely   a   gratifying   development,   for  
reasons   not   only   of   justice,   fairness,   proportionality,   and   basic   human  
decency,  but  also  (perhaps)  of  doctrinal  consistency.  
Still,   my   reactions   to   the   Court’s   inkblot   of   an   opinion   have   run   the  
gamut  from  surprise,  to  that  special  personal  glee  that  comes  from  seeing  a  
rare   constitutional   victory   for   the   rights   of   deportees,   to   less   felicitous  
feelings   such  as  “better   late   than  never,”  and  a   lingering  confusion  about  
its  impact,  upon  which  this  Article  will  elaborate  briefly.    
Positive  it  surely  was,  but  also  rather  late.  For  more  than  a  decade  now,  
many  have  been  deeply   concerned   about   the   state   of   immigration   law   in  
the  wake  of  the  1996  laws  known  as  AEDPA7  and  IIRIRA.8  It  was  apparent  
  
  1   Supreme   Court   Issues   Landmark   Decision,   Upholds   Integrity   of   Criminal   Justice   System   for  
Immigrants,   IMMIGRANT   DEF.   PROJECT,   http://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/index.htm  
(last  updated  Jan.  19,  2011).  
  2   DAN   KESSELBRENNER,   NAT’L   IMMIGRATION   PROJECT   OF   THE   NAT’L   LAWYERS   GUILD,   A  
DEFENDING   IMMIGRANTS   PARTNERSHIP   PRACTICE   ADVISORY:   RETROACTIVE   APPLICABILITY   OF  
PADILLA  V.  KENTUCKY   (2010),  available  at  http://nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources/  
cd_pa_  padilla_  retroactivity.pdf.  
  3    See   Maria   Teresa   Rojas,  A   “Gideon   Decision”   for   Immigrants,   OPEN   SOC’Y   FOUND.   BLOG  
(Apr.  7,  2010),  http://blog.soros.org/2010/04/a-­‐‑gideon-­‐‑for-­‐‑immigrants/.  
  4    130  S.  Ct.  1473  (2010).  
  5    Id.  at  1478.  
  6    In   INS  v.  St.  Cyr,   the  Court   stated   that  “deportation   is  not  punishment   for  past   crimes”  
and  then  imported  an  anti-­‐‑retroactivity  norm  redolent  of  criminal  law  into  the  nominally  civil  
deportation  realm.  533  U.S.  289,  324  (2001).  See  generally  Daniel  Kanstroom,  St.  Cyr  or  Insincere:  
The  Strange  Quality  of  Supreme  Court  Victory,  16  GEO.  IMMIGR.  L.J.  413,  421  (2002).  
  7    Antiterrorism  and  Effective  Death  Penalty  Act  of  1996  (AEDPA),  Pub.  L.  No.  104-­‐‑132,  110  
Stat.  1214  (codified  as  amended  in  scattered  sections  of  8,  18,  22,  28,  40,  42  U.S.C.).  
  8    Illegal   Immigration  Reform  and   Immigrant  Responsibility  Act   of   1996   (IIRIRA),  Pub.  L.  
T  
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that  the  ascendance  of  a  rather  broad-­‐‑brush  “crime  control  justification”  for  
deportation,  “together  with  the  increasing  real-­‐‑world  convergence  between  
[the]   criminal   justice   and   deportation   systems,”   and   the   harshness   of  
deportation   “compel[led]   a   rethinking   of   the   foundational   principles  
underlying   the   constitutional   status   of   deportation.”9   In   particular,   it  
remains   clear   that   “the   constitutional   norms   applicable   to   criminal   cases  
should  inform  our  approach  to  deportation  far  more  specifically  than  they  
have   in   the  past.”10  But  would   courts   actually  be  willing   to  do   this?  And  
how  would  it  best  be  conceptualized?  As  it  turns  out,  the  answers  seem  to  
be:  to  a  limited  degree  and  slowly.  Constitutional  conceptualization  is  still  
a  work  in  progress.  
Prior   to  Padilla,  many  Supreme  Court  decisions   relied  upon  a   simple,  
formalistic   distinction   between   two   consequences   of   certain   criminal  
convictions:  the  punishment  meted  out  in  criminal  courts  and  deportation.  
The  former  was  of  course  “criminal  law,”  while  the  latter  was  “civil,”  or  at  
most  “quasi-­‐‑criminal.”  Every  once  in  a  while,  the  Court,  or  a  Justice  or  two,  
would  be   troubled  by   the   implications  of   this  model   and  would  note   the  
harshness   of   deportation   as   a   sanction   that   could   result   “in   loss   of   both  
property   and   life;   or   of   all   that  makes   life  worth   living.”11   But   one  must  
travel  far  back  in  time,  perhaps  all  the  way  back  to  the  1896  case  of  Wong  
Wing   v.   United   States,12   to   see   the   last   Supreme   Court   case   in   which   the  
inherent  contradictions  of   that   formalistic   civil/criminal  model   resulted   in  
the   invocation   of   specific,   substantive,   constitutional   protections   for  
deportees.   In   that   case,   the  Court   considered   an   1892   deportation   statute  
that  also  authorized  the  imprisonment  at  hard  labor  for  up  to  a  year  of  any  
  
No.   104-­‐‑208,   div.   C,   110   Stat.   3009-­‐‑546   (codified   as   amended   in   scattered   sections   of   8,   18  
U.S.C.).  Both  AEDPA  and  IIRIRA  were  passed  in  the  chaotic  aftermath  of  the  Oklahoma  City  
bombing.  Among  other  features,  the  1996  laws:  
 radically  changed  many  grounds  of  exclusion  and  deportation;  
 retroactively  expanded  criminal  grounds  of  deportation;  
 eliminated  some  and  limited  other  discretionary  waivers  of  deportability;  
 created  mandatory  detention  for  many  classes  of  noncitizens;  
 expedited  deportation  procedures  for  certain  types  of  cases;  
 eliminated  judicial  review  of  certain  types  of  deportation  (removal)  orders;  
 vastly   increased   possible   state   and   local   law   enforcement   involvement   in  
deportation;  and  
 created  a  new  type  of  streamlined  “removal”  proceeding—permitting  the  use  of  
secret  evidence—for  noncitizens  accused  of  “terrorist”  activity.  
See  Daniel  Kanstroom,  Deportation,   Social  Control,   and  Punishment:   Some  Thoughts  About  Why  
Hard  Laws  Make  Bad  Cases,  113  HARV.  L.  REV.  1890,  1891  n.5  (2000).  
  9    Id.  at  1892.  
  10    Id.  
  11    See  Ng  Fung  Ho  v.  White,  259  U.S.  276,  284  (1922).  
  12    163  U.S.  228,  237  (1896).  
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Chinese   citizen   judged   to   be   in   the   United   States   illegally.13   The   statute  
provided   that   such   defendants   would   have   no   right   to   indictment   or  
judicial   trial   before   an   Article   III   judge   or   by   jury.14   The   Court   held   this  
provision   unconstitutional.15   Detention   or   temporary   confinement   was  
permissible,  said  the  Court,  “as  part  of  the  means  necessary  to  give  effect  to  
the  provisions   for   the  exclusion  or  expulsion  of  aliens.”16  However,  when  
Congress   pursues   deportation   policy   by   subjecting   noncitizens   to  
“infamous   punishment   at   hard   labor,   or   by   confiscating   their   property,”  
then   “such   legislation,   to   be   valid,   must   provide   for   a   judicial   trial   to  
establish  the  guilt  of  the  accused.”17  
The   rigid   distinction   drawn   by   the   Wong   Wing   Court   between  
detention  “as  part  of  the  means  necessary,”  and  as  “infamous  punishment”  
obscured  some  very  complex  issues.18  For  example,  Wong  Wing’s  lawyers  
argued   that   the   potential   punishment   for   the   offense  was   purely   criminal  
and  thus  all  constitutional  protections  were  required  for  their  client.19  Had  
they   instead  argued   that   the  proceedings  were  quasi-­‐‑criminal20   they  might  
have   required   the   Court   to   engage   in   a   serious   due   process   analysis.   By  
failing  to  present  a  middle  ground  option,  they  presented  the  Court  with  a  
binary   constitutional   problem:   imprisonment   at   a   hard   labor   camp   was  
either   a   criminal   or   civil   consequence,   and   depending   on   the   judge’s  
determination,  particular  constitutional  consequences  followed.21    
The   theoretical   problem   was   that   deportation   had   already   been  
deemed   a   civil   proceeding   (and   not   punishment   for   constitutional  
purposes)   by   the   Court   in   its   1892   decision   in   Fong   Yue   Ting   v.   United  
States.22   Indeed,   the   Court   had   held   that   the   power   to   deport   was   as  
“absolute   and  unqualified”   as   the   power   to   exclude.23  A  mere   four   years  
later,   the  Court  was  presumably  not  much   interested   in   overturning   that  
precedent   (though  Fong  Yue  Ting  had   inspired  passionate  dissents).  Thus,  
in  Wong  Wing,  the  Court  reaffirmed  the  general  idea  that  the  government’s  
  
  13    Id.;  See  Geary  Act  ch.  60,  §  4,  27  Stat.  25  (1892),  repealed  by  Act  of  Dec.  17,  1943,  ch.  344.  
  14    §  3,  27  Stat.  at  25.  
  15    Wong  Wing,  163  U.S.  at  237-­‐‑38.  
  16    Id.  at  235.  
  17    Id.  at  237.  
  18    DANIEL  KANSTROOM,  DEPORTATION  NATION:  OUTSIDERS  IN  AMERICAN  HISTORY  122  (2007).  
  19    Wong  Wing,  163  U.S.  at  233-­‐‑34.  The  government,  conversely,  argued  that  punishment  at  
hard  labor  did  not  render  the  proceeding  to  be  for  an  “infamous”  crime.  Id.  at  234.  
  20    See  KANSTROOM,  supra  note  18,  at  122;  see  also  Boyd  v.  United  States,  116  U.S.  616,  633-­‐‑34  
(1886)   (“We   are   .   .   .   clearly   of   [the]   opinion   that   proceedings   instituted   for   the   purpose   of  
declaring  the  forfeiture  of  a  man’s  property  by  reason  of  offenses  committed  by  him,  though  
they  may  be  civil  in  form,  are  in  their  nature  criminal.”).  
  21    See  KANSTROOM,  supra  note  18,  at  122.  
  22    149  U.S.  698,  730  (1892).  
  23    Id.  at  762.  
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extra-­‐‑constitutional   “plenary   power”   to   exclude   noncitizens   extended   to  
deportations  from  U.S.  territory:  
  No   limits   can   be   put   by   the   courts   upon   the   power   of  
Congress  to  protect,  by  summary  methods,  the  country  from  the  
advent  of  aliens  whose  race  or  habits  render  them  undesirable  as  
citizens,  or  to  expel  such  if  they  have  already  found  their  way  into  
our  land  and  unlawfully  remain  therein.24  
However,  this  model  was  potentially  in  contention  with  the  decision  of  
the  Wong  Wing  Court   also   to   view   the   constitutional   civil/criminal   line   as  
applicable   to   deportees,   notwithstanding   the   “plenary   power”   doctrine.  
The  Wong  Wing   Court   sought   a   consistent   “theory   of   our   government”25  
with   which   to   distinguish   the   civil   mechanisms   of   deportation   from  
criminal  punishment.  The   fact   that  Congress  had  wrapped  a  year  at  hard  
labor   within   the   deportation   system   did   not   necessarily   override   certain  
specific   constitutional   protections.   The   Court,   in   brief,   did   not   rely   upon  
formalistic  “plenary  power”  doctrine  or,  for  that  matter,  upon  the  status  of  
the   accused   as   “deportable   aliens”   to   avoid   the   functional   dilemma  
presented  by  the  1892  law,  “[b]ut  to  declare  unlawful  residence  within  the  
country  to  be  an  infamous  crime,  punishable  by  deprivation  of  liberty  and  
property,  would  be   to  pass  out  of   the   sphere  of   constitutional   legislation,  
unless  provision  were  made  that  the  fact  of  guilt  should  first  be  established  
by  a  judicial  trial.”26  
  Wong   Wing   thus   raised   an   important   question   that   remains  
unresolved,  even—unfortunately—in  the  wake  of  Padilla  v.  Kentucky:  how  
should  courts  draw  the  line  between  what  might  be  termed  regulatory  civil  
deportation   procedures   and   those   punitive   deportation   procedures   that  
require   constitutional   protections   analogous—if   not   identical—to   those  
afforded  criminal  defendants?27  
Until   Padilla   v.   Kentucky,   the   Supreme   Court   had   never   seriously  
reconsidered  the  basic  analytical  questions  of  if  and  how  this  analysis  ought  
to  be  made  in  the  deportation  context.28  This  Article  will  therefore  begin  to  
consider   the   extent   to   which   it   has   now   done   so.   Given   its   brevity,   the  
purpose  of   this  Article  will  be  more   to  explicate   tensions   than   to  propose  
  
  24    Wong  Wing,  163  U.S.  at  237  (emphasis  added).  
  25    Id.  
26  Id.  
  27    See   Gerald   L.   Neuman,   Wong  Wing   v.   United   States:   The   Bill   of   Rights   Protects   Illegal  
Aliens,  in  IMMIGRATION  STORIES  41,  43-­‐‑45  (2005).  
  28    One  can  see  glimmers  of  recognition  of  the  problem  in  Harisiades  v.  Shaughnessy,  342  U.S.  
580,  593  (1952)  (allowing  retroactive  application  of  a  deportation  statute).  See  also  Reno  v.  Am.-­‐‑
Arab  Anti-­‐‑Discrimination  Comm.,  525  U.S.  471,  489  (1999)   (limiting  applicability  of  selective  
prosecution  defense  in  deportation  cases);  INS  v.  Lopez-­‐‑Mendoza,  468  U.S.  1032,  1050  (1984)  
(holding  that  the  exclusionary  rule  generally  does  not  apply  in  deportation  hearings).  
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detailed   ways   to   resolve   them.   The   latter   task   will   be   saved   for   another  
day.   Still,   generally   speaking,   there   are   three   basic   models:   “plenary  
power”   (i.e.,   no   constitutional   rights   for   deportees—an   untenable,  
inhumane,   and   dangerous   position   that   hardly   requires   discussion);   the  
Sixth  Amendment;  or  Fifth  Amendment  due  process.  
The   Court’s   choice   to   rely   on   the   Sixth   Amendment   in   Padilla   is  
completely  understandable  (it  was,  after  all,  a  criminal  case)  and  in  many  
respects   salutary,   as  discussed  below.  However,   it   is   also   in   tension  with  
the   civil/criminal   distinction,   and   it   raises   complex   questions   about   the  
process   that   might   be   due   to   deportees   both   in   criminal   courts   and   in  
immigration   proceedings.   Part   I   examines   the   facts   and   history   of   the  
Padilla  case  as  it  was  argued  before  the  Supreme  Court.  Part  II  examines  the  
reasoning   of   Justice   Stevens’   majority   opinion,   with   particular   attention  
paid   to  some  of   its  underlying  tensions.  Part   III   then  considers   five  major  
unanswered  questions  that  remain  in  the  wake  of  Justice  Stevens’  opinion  
and  suggests,  generally,  how  courts  might  deal  with  various  problems  of  
applying  the  holding.  
I.  The  Facts  and  Issues  Presented  to  the  Supreme  Court  
Jose  Padilla,  a  lawful  permanent  resident  of  the  United  States  for  over  
forty  years,  was  indicted  on  October  31,  2001,  on  charges  of  possession  of  
marijuana,  possession  of  drug  paraphernalia,   trafficking   in  marijuana   (an  
amount  greater  than  five  pounds),  and  operating  a  truck  without  a  weight  
and  distance  tax  number.29  Apparently,  he  was  driving  a  truck  loaded  with  
marijuana,   along  with   some  drug  paraphernalia.30   This   latter   fact   became  
potentially   relevant   for   reasons   discussed   below.   After   conferring   with  
counsel,  he  pleaded  guilty  to  three  misdemeanor  drug-­‐‑related  charges,  and  
the  Commonwealth  of  Kentucky  dismissed   the  vehicular  violation.31  As  a  
result  of  the  plea  he  faced  deportation.  
Later,   in   post-­‐‑conviction   proceedings,   he   claimed   that   his   criminal  
counsel   not   only   failed   to   advise   him   of   the   deportation   consequence  
before   he   entered   the   plea,   but   actually   told   him   not   to   worry   about  
deportation  since  he  had  lived  in  this  country  so  long.32  Assuming  this  was  
true,  it  was  an  absolutely  astonishing  lack  of   judgment  by  the  lawyer,  but  
one  that,  sadly,  is  not  as  rare  as  one  might  think  or  hope.  
As  a  teacher  of  criminal  law  and  practice  along  with  immigration  law,  I  
have   trained  many   criminal   defense   lawyers,   as  well   as   prosecutors   and  
judges  in  the  intricacies  of  immigration  consequences.  Technicalities  aside,  
what  I  frequently  used  to  tell  them  boiled  down  to  three  key  points:  
  
  29    Padilla  v.  Kentucky,  130  S.  Ct.  1473,  1477  (2010).  
30  Commonwealth  v.  Padilla,  253  S.W.3d  482,  483  (Ky.  2008).  
  31    Id.  
  32    Id.  
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1. If   you   think   defending   the   rights   of   criminal   defendants   is  
difficult  (and  it  surely  is),  try  working  without  a  constitution  for  
a  while—that  is  what  a  lot  of  immigration  law  is;  
2. If  you  think  criminal  law  is  complicated  (and  it  is),  you  have  no  
idea   what   complicated   is—immigration   law,   though   often  
dreadfully   depressing,   is   fun   in   one   way:   it   is   full   of   great  
quotations   by   judges   about   how   complicated   it   is.   (This   is   a  
concept  I  once  referred  to  as  “jurisprudential  Schadenfreude.”33);  
3. Most   importantly,   even   though   I   strongly   believe   that   criminal  
lawyers   have   an   ethical   obligation   to   advise   clients   about  
immigration   consequences,   do   not   think   you   are   an   immigration  
lawyer—just   watch   out   for   certain   big   mistakes   (like   mistakenly  
pleading  your  client  into  deportation,  for  example),  and  then  be  
sure   to   refer  your  client   to  a  good   immigration   lawyer.  A  good  
pro  bono  specialist  might  be  available,  but  more  likely  your  client  
will  have  to  pay.  
In  any  event,  Mr.  Padilla  alleged  that  he  would  have  gone  to  trial  had  
he   not   received   the   incorrect   immigration   law   advice.34   This  was   at   least  
plausible  because  his  new  lawyer  argued  that  knowledge  of  the  contents  of  
the   truck  was   a   real   issue   in   the   case   under  Kentucky   law.35  Apparently,  
notwithstanding   the   paraphernalia   on   the   seat   next   to   him,   and   the  
admission  he  allegedly  made   to   the  police,  Mr.  Padilla   could  have   raised  
such   a   defense.   Nevertheless,   the   trial   judge   “summarily”   denied   his  
motion   without   an   evidentiary   hearing.36   Interestingly,   part   of   the   trial  
court’s   reasoning   was   that   Padilla’s   bond   had   been   changed   because   he  
was  suspected  of  being  “an   illegal  alien.”  Therefore,  opined   the   judge,  he  
must  have  been  aware  of   the  possibility  of  deportation.37   Indeed,   the   trial  
court   noted   that   Padilla’s   counsel   did   discuss   the   deportation   issue   with  
him  (albeit  incorrectly).  As  quoted  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Kentucky,  the  
  
  33    See   Kanstroom   supra   note   6,   at   420-­‐‑21   (“[U]pon   first   reading   the   Supreme   Court’s  
opinions   in   INS   v.   St.   Cyr,   INS   v.   Calcano-­‐‑Martinez,   and  Zadvydas   v.  Davis,   I   could   not   help  
think[ing]  .  .  .  that  I  might  be  deprived  of  an  odd,  guilty,  sort  of  jurisprudential  Schadenfreude  
that  had  long  pervaded  my  psyche  and  motivated  my  teaching  and  scholarship.  Could  it  be  
that  the  apparently  definitive  erosion  of  some  of  the  worst  implications  of  the  plenary  power  
doctrine  might   make   the   subject   less   fun   to   teach?  Will   we   no   longer   be   able   to   cite   with  
approval  bons  mots  like,  ‘In  an  example  of  legislative  draftsmanship  that  would  cross  the  eyes  
of   a  Talmudic   scholar,   Section   306(c)(1)  now   reads   .   .   .   ’   or   ‘   .   .   .  morsels   of   comprehension  
must   be   pried   from  mollusks   of   jargon.’  Will  we   have   to   abandon   our   staple  metaphors   of  
neglected  step-­‐‑children  and  the  like?”).  
  34    Padilla,  130  S.  Ct.  at  1478.  
  35    Reply  Brief  of  Petitioner  at  25-­‐‑26,  Padilla,  130  S.  Ct.  1473  (No.  08-­‐‑651).  
  36    Padilla  v.  Commonwealth,  No.  2004-­‐‑CA-­‐‑001981-­‐‑MR,  2006  Ky.  App.  LEXIS  98,  at  *3  (Ky.  
Ct.  App.  Mar.  31,  2006).  
  37    Id.  at  *10.  
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trial  court  concluded  that:  “Padilla’s  counsel  does  not  make  a  deportation  
decision  and  neither  does  this  Court.”38  As  we  shall  see,  this  vignette  may  
yet  be  a  cautionary  tale  even  after  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court’s  decision.  
The   Kentucky   Court   of   Appeals   disagreed   with   the   trial   court   and  
remanded   the   case   for   an   evidentiary   hearing   on   Padilla’s   ineffective  
assistance   of   counsel   claim.39   This   was   interesting   because   the   Kentucky  
Supreme   Court   had   recently   made   clear   that   so-­‐‑called   “collateral  
consequences”  were  outside   the   “scope  of   representation   required  by   the  
Sixth   Amendment.”40   Thus,   a   defense   counsel’s   failure   to   advise   a  
defendant  of  the  potential  immigration  consequences  that  may  flow  from  a  
plea  was  not  “cognizable  as  a  claim  for  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel.”41  
Still,   the   majority   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   panel   distinguished   Padilla’s  
case  from  the  Kentucky  Supreme  Court’s  prior  holding  and  reasoned  that  
“although   collateral   consequences   do   not   have   to   be   advised,   ‘an  
affirmative  act  of  gross  misadvice  relating   to  collateral  matters  can   justify  
post-­‐‑conviction   relief.’”42   The   Court   of   Appeals   held   that   counsel’s  
incorrect   advice   regarding   removal   could   constitute   ineffective   assistance  
of  counsel.43  
One   dissenter,   however,   believed   that   Padilla’s   statement   about  
misadvice  was  “simply  not  credible”  because  “[l]ong  before  he  entered  his  
plea,  within  days  after  his  arrest,  Padilla  was   informed  that  his  bond  was  
changed  from  $25,000  cash  to  “no  bond”  for  the  stated  reason  that  he  was  
“believed   to   be   an   illegal   alien   and   [was]   awaiting   deportation   by   the  
Federal  authorities.”44  
The  Kentucky  Supreme  Court  did  not  feel  it  was  important  to  examine  
Padilla’s   credibility   or   the   facts   of   his   case   at   all.   It   simply   reversed   the  
appeals   court   decision   and   eliminated   any   possible   exception   to   its   prior  
holdings  about  the  scope  of  the  Sixth  Amendment.  It  recognized  that  many  
jurisdictions   had   held   that   when   an   attorney   offers   “grossly   erroneous  
advice   to   a   defendant   which   is   material   in   inducing   a   guilty   plea”   this  
might   constitute   ineffective   assistance   of   counsel.45   Still,   the   court  
concluded:  
[O]ur  unequivocal  holding  in  Fuartado  leaves  Appellee  without  a  
remedy  .  .  .  .  As   collateral   consequences   are  outside   the   scope  of  
the  guarantee  of  the  Sixth  Amendment  right  to  counsel,  it  follows  
  
  38    Commonwealth  v.  Padilla,  253  S.W.3d  482,  483  (Ky.  2008).  
  39    Id.  
  40    Id.  at  483  (citing  Fuartado  v.  Commonwealth,  170  S.W.3d  384  (Ky.  2005)).    
41  Id.    
42  Id.  at  483-­‐‑84  (quoting  Padilla,  2006  Ky.  App.  LEXIS  98,  at  *7).  
43  Id.  
  44    Padilla,  2006  Ky.  App.  LEXIS  98,  at  *10  (Henry,  J.,  dissenting).  
  45    Padilla,  253  S.W.3d  at  484.  
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that  counsel’s  failure  to  advise  Appellee  of  such  collateral  issue[s]  
or  his  act  of  advising  Appellee   incorrectly  provides  no  basis   for  
relief.46  
Two   dissenters   from   the   Kentucky   Supreme   Court’s   opinion   agreed  
with   the   basic   framework   as   to   collateral   consequences.   However,   they  
thought  that  it  was  not  “too  much  of  a  burden  to  place  on  our  defense  bar  
the  duty  to  say,  ‘I  do  not  know.’”47  
Put   in  doctrinal   terms,   the  Kentucky  Supreme  Court  denied  Padilla’s  
application  for  post-­‐‑conviction  relief  on  the  bright-­‐‑line,  formalistic  ground  
that   the   Sixth  Amendment’s   effective-­‐‑assistance-­‐‑of-­‐‑counsel   guarantee   did  
not   protect   defendants   even   from   clearly   erroneous   deportation   advice  
because  deportation  was  merely  a  “collateral”  consequence  of  a  conviction.  
II.  Justice  Stevens’s  Majority  Opinion  
Jose   Padilla’s   Petition   for   a  Writ   of   Certiorari   highlighted   two  major  
questions  raised  by  the  case:  
1.   [w]hether   the  mandatory  deportation   consequences   that   stem  
from   a   plea   to  .  .  .   an   “aggravated   felony”  .  .  .   is   a   “collateral  
consequence”   of   a   criminal   conviction   which   relieves   counsel  
from  any  affirmative  duty  to  .  .  .  advise;  and  
2.  .  .  .   whether   counsel’s   gross   misadvice   as   to   the   collateral  
consequence   of   deportation   can   constitute   a   ground   for   setting  
aside  a  guilty  plea  .  .  .  .  48  
The   lawyers   framed  these   issues  very  carefully   in  an  obvious  attempt  
to  narrow  the  scope  of  what  the  Court  had  to  decide.  They  were  clever  to  
do   this,  and  successful.   Indeed,   the   first  question’s   focus  on  “mandatory”  
deportation  became  a  centerpiece  of  the  Supreme  Court’s  reasoning,  and  to  
a  large  degree,  obviated  the  need  to  consider  the  second  question  at  all.  
Essentially,  the  Supreme  Court  rejected  the  Kentucky  Supreme  Court’s  
formalistic  approach  to  the  Sixth  Amendment,  and  then  five  Justices  went  
far  beyond  the  “misadvice”  issue.49  The  Court’s  basic  holding  was  dramatic  
and   portentous,   if   perhaps   not   completely   consistent   or   comprehensive:  
The   interpretation   of   the   Sixth   Amendment   now   requires   that   criminal  
defense   counsel   advise   at   least   some   noncitizens   about   certain   types   of  
  
  46    Id.  at  485.  Counsel  is  not  required  to  address  the  matter  in  either  instance,  and,  therefore,  
an  attorney’s  failure  to  do  so  cannot  constitute  ineffectiveness  entitling  a  criminal  defendant  to  
relief  under  Strickland  v.  Washington.  466  U.S.  668,  686,  688  (1984).  
  47    Padilla,  253  S.W.3d  at  485  (Cunningham,  J.,  dissenting).  
  48    Petition  for  a  Writ  of  Certiorari  at  3,  Padilla  v.  Kentucky,  130  S.  Ct.  1473  (2010)  (No.  08-­‐‑
651),  2008  WL  4933628  at  *i.  
  49    Padilla,  130  S.  Ct.  at  1478,  1487.  Chief  Justice  Roberts  and  Justice  Alito  concurred  but  only  
as   to   “misadvice.”   Id.   at   1487,   1494   (Alito,   J.,   concurring).   Justices   Scalia   and   Thomas  
dissented.  Id.  at  1494  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting).  
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immigration   consequences   before   tendering   a   guilty   plea.50   As   the   Court  
put  it:  “[C]onstitutionally  competent  counsel  would  have  advised  [Padilla]  
that   his   conviction   for   drug   distribution   made   him   subject   to   automatic  
deportation.”51  
This   holding   was   clearly   of   historic   significance.   As   noted   above,  
deportation   had   long   been   widely   considered   to   be   a   mere   “collateral  
consequence”   of   the   criminal   justice   system,   like   losing   the   right   to   vote,  
eviction  from  public  housing,  or  the  loss  of  the  right  to  possess  firearms.  Of  
course   it   was   well-­‐‑recognized   as   harsh,   but   the   prevailing   formalist  
understanding  of  the  Sixth  Amendment  did  not—for  the  most  part—apply  
to  deportation  consequences,  even  if  they  were  in  reality  much  worse  than  
the   criminal   consequences   in   a   given   case.   For   example,   a   fine   or   a  
suspended   sentence   could   lead   to   permanent   banishment   of   a   long-­‐‑term  
legal   resident  with   family.   The   Court’s   decision   thus  moved   deportation  
law  somewhat  from  the  formalist,  insulated  realm  of  the  “civil”  into  a  more  
functionalist  discourse  in  which  its  true  nature  matters.  But  there  are  major  
gaps  in  the  reasoning  of  the  opinion  that  leave  big  questions.  
III.  Five  Features  of  Padilla  v.  Kentucky  That  Leave  Profound  Questions  
Unanswered  
A. “Virtually  Inevitable”  Deportation  Versus  Complexity  and  
Discretion  
The  Supreme  Court  was  clearly  concerned  about  how  far  this  decision  
might  go  and  how  it  would  relate  to  prior  Sixth  Amendment  precedents.  I  
believe  that  it  is  for  this  reason  that  the  opinion  begins  with  this  powerful  
assertion:  
The   landscape   of   federal   immigration   law   has   changed  
dramatically  over   the   last  90  years.  While  once  there  was  only  a  
narrow   class   of   deportable   offenses   and   judges   wielded   broad  
discretionary   authority   to   prevent   deportation,   immigration  
reforms  over  time  have  expanded  the  class  of  deportable  offenses  
and   limited   the   authority   of   judges   to   alleviate   the   harsh  
consequences   of   deportation.   The   “drastic   measure”   of  
deportation   or   removal   is   now   virtually   inevitable   for   a   vast  
number  of  noncitizens  convicted  of  crimes.52  
The   importance   of   this   “virtually   inevitable”   formulation   is   that   it  
enabled  the  Court  to  build  an  analytic  bridge  between  criminal  prosecution  
and  deportation.  Thus,  the  majority  concluded  that:  
  
50  Id.  at  1483  
  51    Id.  at  1478  (majority  opinion)  (emphasis  added).  
  52    Id.(emphasis  added)  (quoting  Fong  Haw  Tan  v.  Phelan,  333  U.S.  6,  10  (1948).  
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The   importance  of   accurate   legal   advice   for  noncitizens   accused  
of  crimes  has  never  been  more  important.  These  changes  confirm  
our  view  that,  as  a  matter  of  federal  law,  deportation  is  an  integral  
part—indeed,  sometimes  the  most  important  part—of  the  penalty  
that  may  be  imposed  on  noncitizen  defendants  who  plead  guilty  
to  specified  crimes.53  
This  is  a  point  on  which  a  bit  more  thought  might  be  warranted.  First,  
one  might  ask  a  question  of  logic:  does  causation  necessarily  imply  unity?  I  
do  not  think  so.  Imagine  a  situation  where  lightning  strikes  the  ground  in  a  
very   dry   forest,   causing   a   forest   fire.   We   might   well   say   that   this   was  
virtually   inevitable.   But   it   does  not   compel   the   conclusion   that   the   fire   is  
now  an  “integral  part”  of  the  weather,  does  it?  
Moreover,   what   should   we   make   of   the   fact   that   many   deportation  
consequences   are   not   automatic   or   even   “virtually   inevitable?”   Good  
lawyering  in  immigration  courts  can  make  a  big  difference  in  how  certain  
crimes   are   understood,  whether   the   government   has   proven   its   case,   etc.  
Further,   the   major   question   in   a   criminal   case   often   may   be   whether   a  
particular   plea   will   eliminate   the   chance   to   apply   for   what   is   known   as  
“discretionary  relief”  from  deportation.  This  raises  two  questions:  why  did  
the  Court   focus  so  strongly  on  this  “virtually   inevitable”  aspect;  and  how  
far  does  it  color  the  rest  of  the  holding?  
The  answer  to  the  first  question  cannot  be  that  the  Court  was  unaware  
of   the   problem.   Indeed,   Justice   Stevens   himself   had   written   the   Court’s  
opinion   in   INS   v.   St.   Cyr   nearly   a   decade   ago,   which   was   all   about  
discretionary  relief.54  As  the  Padilla  Court  put  it:  
[W]e   have   recognized   that   “preserving   the   possibility   of”  
discretionary   relief   from  deportation   under   §   212(c)   of   the   1952  
INA,   .   .   .  “would  have  been  one  of   the  principal  benefits  sought  
by  defendants  deciding  whether  to  accept  a  plea  offer  or  instead  
to  proceed  to  trial.”  St.  Cyr  533  U.S.,  at  323,  .  .  .  We  expected  that  
counsel  who  were   unaware   of   the   discretionary   relief  measures  
would   “follo[w]   the   advice   of   numerous   practice   guides”   to  
advise   themselves   of   the   importance   of   this   particular   form   of  
discretionary  relief.55  
However,  as  to  non-­‐‑automatic,  non-­‐‑integral  deportation  consequences,  
the   Padilla   Court   still   did   not   enunciate   an   especially   clear   Sixth  
Amendment  standard:  
There   will,   therefore,   undoubtedly   be   numerous   situations   in  
which   the   deportation   consequences   of   a   particular   plea   are  
unclear  or  uncertain.  The  duty  of  the  private  practitioner  in  such  
cases   is   more   limited.   When   the   law   is   not   succinct   and  
  
  53    Id.  at  1480  (footnote  omitted).  
54    533  U.S.  289,  311  (2001).  
  55    Padilla,  130  S.  Ct.  at  1483  (citations  omitted)  (quoting  St  Cyr,  533  U.S.  at  323  &  n.50.    
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straightforward  .  .  .  ,  a  criminal  defense  attorney  need  do  no  more  
than  advise  a  noncitizen  client  that  pending  criminal  charges  may  
carry  a  risk  of  adverse  immigration  consequences.56  
So   it   seems   that,   although   the   Sixth  Amendment   now   applies   to   both  
types  of  consequences,   its  requirements  vary.  Why  did  the  Court  do  this?  
One  could  sum  it  up  in  three  small  words:  fear  of  floodgates,  or  perhaps  in  a  
few  larger  words:  maintenance  of  a  vestige  of  doctrinal  consistency.  
The  “floodgates”  problem  is  a  real  one,  with  two  distinct  aspects.  First,  
there   is   the   problem  of   other   collateral   consequences.   If   deportation   now  
counts,  why  not  voting  rights,  public  housing,  gun  possession,  etc.?  During  
oral   argument,   Justice   Scalia   expressed   his   concern   about   how   the  Court  
would   “decide   whether   we   are   opening   a   Pandora’s   box   here,   whether  
there   is   any   sensible  way   to   restrict   it   to—to  deportation.”57  This   box  not  
only   contains   a   welter   of   potential   civil   collateral   consequences   and  
procedural   venues   such   as   prison   disciplinary   proceedings,58   but   many  
line-­‐‑drawing  problems  in  the  criminal  system  as  well.59  It  seems  that  both  
Padilla’s   counsel   and   the   Court   majority   concluded   that   the   “virtually  
inevitable”  test  was  the  best  way  to  limit  the  extension  of  the  case.60  
As   for   doctrinal   consistency,   the   Court’s   model,   interestingly,  
incorporates   the   same   dichotomy   between   law   and   discretion   that  
animated  Justice  Stevens’s  opinion  in  St.  Cyr,  albeit   in  the  rather  different  
context  of  habeas  corpus.61  As  I  have  suggested  elsewhere,   this   line   is  not  
so   clear   as   it  might   seem   at   first   blush.62   Indeed,   even   aggravated   felony  
cases  may  involve  various  types  of  interpretive  discretion  by  the  Board  of  
Immigration  Appeals  to  which  federal  courts  have  sometimes  deferred,  per  
Chevron  U.S.A.   Inc.   v.   Natural   Resources  Defense   Council63   (which  was   also  
written  by  Justice  Stevens).  As  a  Sixth  Amendment  standard  it  is  somewhat  
puzzling.   Imagine   if   it   applied   in   criminal   cases.   What   might   it   mean?  
  
  56    Id.  
  57    Transcript  of  Oral  Argument  at  7,  Padilla,  130  S.  Ct.  1473  (No.  08-­‐‑651).  
  58    See  Wolff  v.  McDonnell,  418  U.S.  539,  570,  576-­‐‑77  (1974)  (holding  that  there  is  no  right  to  
counsel   in   prison  disciplinary  proceedings   and  prison   officials  may   open   inmate  mail   from  
counsel  so  long  as  the  prisoner  is  present).  
  59    See,  e.g.,  Coleman  v.  Thompson,  501  U.S.  722,  752-­‐‑54  (1991)  (holding  there  is  no  right  to  
effective  assistance  of  counsel  in  a  capital  state  post-­‐‑conviction  proceeding  because  there  is  no  
underlying  right  to  counsel);  Wainwright  v.  Torna,  455  U.S.  586,  587-­‐‑88  (1982)  (citing  Ross  v.  
Moffitt,  417  U.S.  600,  617  (1974))  (holding  there  is  no  right  to  effective  assistance  of  counsel  in  
a  state  discretionary  appeal  because  there  is  no  right  to  counsel  in  the  first  place).  
60  Padilla,  130  S.  Ct.  at  1483.  
  61    Compare  Padilla,  130  S.  Ct.  at  1483,  with  INS  v.  St.  Cyr,  533  U.S.  289,  311  (2001).  
  62    See   KANSTROOM,   supra   note   18,   at   231-­‐‑40;   Kanstroom,   supra   note   6,   at   423-­‐‑28;   see   also  
Daniel   Kanstroom,   The   Better   Part   of   Valor:   The   REAL   ID   Act,   Discretion,   and   the   “Rule”   of  
Immigration  Law,  51  N.Y.L.  SCH.  L.  REV.  161,  165  (2006).  
63  467  U.S.  837  (1984).  
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Would   a   defense   lawyer   be   required   to   advise   her   client   properly   in   the  
guilt  phase  but  then  only  about  possible  mandatory  sentencing,  not  about  
the  more   usual   discretionary   sentencing   that   judges   do?   In   any   case,   the  
differentiation   between   the   automatic   and   the   discretionary   is   a  
complicated  move   that  may   have   dramatic   real-­‐‑world   costs   and   obvious  
benefits.  On  the  other  hand,  the  big  practical  question  lurking  behind  this  
opinion  is:  how  much  specialized  immigration  law  knowledge  can  fairly  or  
realistically  be  expected  from  criminal  defense  lawyers?  
B. The  Weight  of  Professional  Norms  
The   Court   in   Padilla   reiterated   its   two-­‐‑pronged   approach   from  
Strickland  v.  Washington.64  The  first  prong,  which  is  known  as  constitutional  
deficiency,  is  necessarily  linked  to  the  practice  and  expectations  of  the  legal  
community:  “The  proper  measure  of  attorney  performance  remains  simply  
reasonableness   under   prevailing   professional   norms.”65   The  Padilla  Court  
concluded  that   the  “weight  of  prevailing  professional  norms  supports   the  
view   that   counsel   must   advise   her   client   regarding   the   risk   of  
deportation.”66   Again,   this  was   very   gratifying   for   those   of   us  who   have  
worked  for  years  to  nurture  such  professional  norms.  But  note  that  this  is  a  
moving  target  of  a  standard,  and  Padilla  itself  moves  it  greatly.  Put  simply,  
the  reasonableness  norm  could  become  a  higher  bar  as  we  better  train  our  
criminal  defense  attorneys.  During  oral  argument,  Mr.  Long,  the  Assistant  
Attorney  General  from  Kentucky,  had  a  long  colloquy  with  Justice  Breyer  
about  what  the  prevailing  professional  norms  were  and  what  they  should  
be.  
Justice  Breyer  asked  him  a  provocative  question:  
JUSTICE   BREYER:   Suppose   a—a   client   comes   in.   You   are   a  
criminal   lawyer  and  you   learn   the   facts  of   the  case,  and   it   turns  
out  that,  after  listening  to  the  facts,  you  think  he  is  being  charged  
with  a  fairly  minor  offense,  a  year  maybe  max,  and  he  tells  you:  
You  know,   I   have   a   family   here,   I’ve—I’ve—you  know,   he   tells  
you  this  story  where  it  is  quite  apparent  to  you  that  if  he  pleads  
guilty,  back  he  goes,  where  he  might  be  killed  and  so  might  his  
family.  Just  sit  there  and  say  nothing?  What  would  you  do?67  
They  went  back  and  forth  on  this  (Long  did  not  want  to  admit  it  was  a  
professional  norm).  Indeed,  he  called  it  a  “question  of  morals.”68  And  then  
Justice  Scalia  weighed  in  with  a  sarcastic  dose  of   legal  realism.”  Well,  but  
assuming  it’s  a  norm  and  that  all  lawyers  do  it,  including  those  that  know  
  
64  466  U.S.  668  (1984)  
  65    Strickland,  466  U.S.  at  688.  
  66    Padilla,  130  S.  Ct.  at  1482.  
  67    Transcript  of  Oral  Argument,  supra  note  57,  at  37.  
  68    Id.  at  39.  
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diddly  [sic]  about  immigration  law,  the  norm  is  to  give  bad  advice.  And—
and  here  the  norm  was  met,  right?”69  
According   to   the   transcript,  what   followed  was   simply  “[l]aughter.”70  
But  the  fact  remains  that  the  fluidity  of  evolving  norms  will  remain  a  live  
issue  for  many  years  to  come.  
C. Future  Convergence  
A  third  big-­‐‑picture  question  going  forward  is   the  extent  to  which  this  
case   signals   a   convergence   between   the   norms   of   the   criminal   justice  
system  and  the  deportation  system.  Scholars  have  been  considering  this  for  
some  time,  and  it  is  a  trend  with  many  features—some  potentially  positive  
and  some  rather  worrisome  (see  for  example,  Arizona).71  The  Padilla  Court  
said:  
  Finally,   informed   consideration   of   possible   deportation   can  
only  benefit  both  the  State  and  noncitizen  defendants  during  the  
plea-­‐‑bargaining   process.   By   bringing   deportation   consequences  
into  this  process,  the  defense  and  prosecution  may  well  be  able  to  
reach  agreements   that  better  satisfy   the   interests  of  both  parties.  
As   in   this   case,   a   criminal   episode   may   provide   the   basis   for  
multiple   charges,   of   which   only   a   subset   mandate   deportation  
following  conviction.  Counsel  who  possess  the  most  rudimentary  
understanding   of   the   deportation   consequences   of   a   particular  
criminal  offense  may  be  able   to  plea  bargain  creatively  with   the  
prosecutor  in  order  to  craft  a  conviction  and  sentence  that  reduce  
the   likelihood  of  deportation,  as  by  avoiding  a  conviction  for  an  
offense   that   automatically   triggers   the   removal   consequence.  At  
the   same   time,   the   threat   of   deportation   may   provide   the  
defendant  with  a  powerful  incentive  to  plead  guilty  to  an  offense  
that  does  not  mandate  that  penalty  in  exchange  for  a  dismissal  of  
a  charge  that  does.72  
Now  there  is  a   lot  packaged  in  this,  some  of   it  healthy  and  some  of   it  
potentially   pernicious.   On   the   positive   side,   it   does   have   the   virtue   of  
bringing   out   into   the   open   the   post-­‐‑entry   social   control   function   of  
deportation  (i.e.,  the  fact  that  this  form  of  deportation  is  not  really  related  
to   border   control   in   any   significant   way).73   Because   of   this,   more   of   the  
substantive  constitutional  norms  of   the  criminal  system  ought   to  apply  at  
least   in   those   sorts   of   deportation   cases—the   right   to   appointed   counsel,  
the  exclusionary  rule,  double  jeopardy,  and  the  ex  post  facto  clause—just  to  
name  a   few.   If  prosecutors  are  now  encouraged  by   the  Supreme  Court   to  
  
  69    Id.  
  70    Id.  
  71    See,  e.g.,  S.B.  1070,  49th  Leg.  2d  Reg.  Sess.  (Ariz.  2010).  
  72    Padilla  v.  Kentucky,  130  S.  Ct.  1473,  1486  (2010).  
  73    See  KANSTROOM,  supra  note  18,  at  3-­‐‑7.  
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bargain   about  deportation   in   the   criminal   process,   it   is   a   pretty   complete  
convergence.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  do  we  really  want  state  prosecutors  to  
be  attempting   to  use  deportation   for   leverage   in   criminal   cases?  Are   they  
trained  for  that?  Should  they  be?  Is  it  even  legal,  in  light  of  the  preemption  
concerns   expressed   by   the   Department   of   Justice   in   its   challenges   to   the  
Arizona  laws?74  Further,  how  can  defense  lawyers  effectively  bargain  about  
the   full   range   of   deportation   consequences   when   they   do   not   have   the  
training  to  even  anticipate  them,  let  alone  to  defend  against  them?  
D. How  Can  There  Still  Be  No  Right  To  Counsel  in  Deportation  
Proceedings?  
The   most   fundamental   lurking   problem   is   that   of   the   deportation  
proceeding   itself.   This   might   be   conceptualized   as   a   Sixth   Amendment  
problem  (if  deportation  is  sufficiently  linked  to  the  criminal  process  that  it  
mandates   counsel   in   that   situation,   why   is   the   same   thing   not   true   in  
immigration   court?).   It  might   also   be   understood   as   a   due   process/equal  
protection   problem.   It   now   seems   a   rather   striking   irony   and   possibly   a  
constitutional  problem  that  a  criminal  defendant  has  a  constitutional  right  
to   counsel   who   can   explain   and   advise   as   to   at   least   some   possible  
deportation  consequences,  while  a  person  arrested  for  being  simply  out  of  
status   has   no   such   right.   What   if   that   person   had   consulted   a   housing  
attorney  who  gave  bad  advice  and  a  resulting  eviction  proceeding  had  then  
brought  her   to   the   attention  of   ICE?  Put  most   simply,   the   conundrum   is:  
how   can   one   have   a   constitutional   right   to   counsel   for   advice   about  
consequences   that   come   from  a  process   in  which   the   same  person  has  no  
constitutional  right  to  counsel?  
E. Counsel/Status/Territory  
This   is  where   the  deepest   aspects   of   the  new  Padilla-­‐‑inspired   right   to  
counsel   jurisprudence  relate  to  a  host  of  underlying  problems.  Briefly,  the  
main   meta-­‐‑question   is,   how   does   our   law   of   the   right   to   counsel   for  
deportees   now   match   up   against   certain   variables:   legal   status   (citizen  
versus   noncitizen);   the   formal   nature   of   the   proceeding   (civil   versus  
criminal   or   something   else);   and   territory   (on   or   outside   US   territory)?  
There  is  much  to  ponder  here,  but  for  now  I  will  just  highlight  some  of  the  
tensions.  
One   way   to   do   this   is   to   consider   a   series   of   cases   that,   ironically,  
involved  another  man  named  Jose  Padilla.75  He  was  a  U.S.  citizen  who  was  
  
  74    Complaint  at  1,  United  States  v.  Arizona,  703  F.  Supp.  2d  980  (D.  Ariz.  2010)  (No.  01413-­‐‑
NVW).  
  75    Padilla  ex  rel.  Newman  v.  Bush,  233  F.  Supp.  2d  564,  568  (S.D.N.Y.  2002),  aff’d  in  part,  rev’d  
in  part  sub  nom.  Padilla  v.  Rumsfeld,  352  F.3d  695  (2d  Cir.  2003),  rev’d,  542  U.S.  426  (2004).  
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initially   detained   as   a   material   witness   in   criminal   proceedings,   but   not  
charged,  and  then  designated  an  “enemy  combatant.”76  This  designation—
an   ambiguous   term   largely   invented   rather   ad   hoc   by   the   Bush  
Administration—required   a   considerable   degree   of   judicial   analysis   to  
determine   its   legitimate   meaning,   particularly   when   applied   to   a   U.S.  
citizen  arrested  on  U.S.  soil.  
What   is   often  under-­‐‑appreciated  about   this   first   set   of  Padilla   cases   is  
that  a  major  question  in  the  district  court  in  New  York  was  whether  Padilla  
was   entitled   to   appointed   counsel   after   he   was   designated   with   this  
ambiguous,   potentially   quasi-­‐‑criminal,   legal   status.77   On   November   13,  
2001,  President  Bush  had  signed  an  order  directing  that  persons  whom  he  
would  determine  to  be  “members  of  al  Qaeda,  or  other  persons  who  [had]  
helped   or   agreed   to   commit   acts   of   terrorism   aimed   at   this   country,   or  
harbored   such   persons,   and   who   are   not   United   States   citizens,”   would   be  
subject   to   trial   before   military   tribunals.78   This,   of   course,   was   the  
beginning  of   the  current  use  of  Guantánamo  Bay.  But  the  Bush  Order   left  
U.S.  citizens  in  a  kind  of  limbo.  Consequently,  Jose  Padilla  was  arrested  on  
May   8,   2002,   in   Chicago,   on   a   material-­‐‑witness   warrant   to   enforce   a  
subpoena   to   secure   his   testimony  before   a   grand   jury   in  New  York.79  On  
May  15,  2002,   following  Padilla’s   removal   from  Chicago   to  New  York,  he  
appeared   in   court,   and   Donna   R.   Newman   was   appointed   to   represent  
him.80   She   conferred  with  Padilla   and,   a  week   later,  moved   to   vacate   the  
warrant.81   The   government   disclosed   to   the   court   ex   parte   that   it   was  
withdrawing  the  subpoena  a  mere  two  days  after  Padilla  filed  the  motion  
to  vacate.82  The  government  then  notified  the  court  that  the  President  had  
classified  Padilla   as   an   enemy   combatant   and  directed  Donald  Rumsfeld,  
Secretary   of   Defense,   to   detain   him,   and   further   that   the   Department   of  
Defense  would  take  custody  of  Padilla   immediately,   transferring  him  to  a  
naval   brig   in   South   Carolina.83   Attorney   Newman   filed   a   habeas   corpus  
petition  but  was  told  by  the  government  that  she  would  not  be  permitted  
to  visit  Padilla  at  the  South  Carolina  facility,  or  to  speak  with  him;  she  was  
told   she   could   write   to   Padilla,   but   that   he   might   not   receive   the  
  
  76    Id.  at  568-­‐‑69.  
  77    Id.  at  600.  
  78    Id.  at   571;   see  Military  Order   of  Nov.   13,   2001,   66   Fed.  Reg.   57,833,   57,833-­‐‑34   (Nov.   16,  
2001)   (emphasis   added),   available   at   http://frwebgate1.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/PDFgate.cgi?  
WAISdocID=KzJpxA/0/2/0&WAISaction=retrieve.  
  79    Padilla,   233   F.   Supp.   2d   at   571   (explaining   that   the  warrant  was   issued   pursuant   to   18  
U.S.C.  §  3144  (2000)).  
  80    Id.  
  81    Id.  
  82    Id.  
  83    Id.  
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correspondence.84  
After  this,  the  government  strenuously  argued  that  Padilla  had  no  right  
to   counsel.85   Some   of   the   arguments   were   quite   remarkable   but   the   basic  
idea  was  that  Padilla  needed  to  be  rendered  completely  without  hope  in  order  
to  be  properly  interrogated.86  
  
  84    Aff.  of  Donna  R.  Newman,  Esq.  at  ¶  8,  Padilla  ex  rel.  Newman  v.  Bush,  233  F.  Supp.  2d  
564   (S.D.N.Y.   2002)   (No.   02   Civ.   4445),   available   at  http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69News  
DocumentOrder/FileUpload500/194/Padilla_Joint_Appendix.pdf.  
  85  Padilla,  233  F.  Supp.  2d  at  603.    The  court  explained:  
The  government  has  argued  that  affording  access  to  counsel  would  
“jeopardize   the   two   core   purposes   of   detaining   enemy   combatants—
gathering  intelligence  about  the  enemy,  and  preventing  the  detainee  from  
aiding   in  any   further   attacks  against  America.”  This  would  happen,   the  
government   argues,   because   access   to   counsel   would   interfere   with  
questioning,   and   because   al   Qaeda   operatives   are   trained   to   use   third  
parties   as   intermediaries   to   pass   messages   to   fellow   terrorists,   even   if  
“[t]he  intermediaries  may  be  unaware  that  they  are  being  so  used.”  
Id.  at  603  (citations  omitted).  
  86    Id.  at  603-­‐‑05.  As  Judge  Mukasey  put  it  in  a  later  case  involving  Padilla:  
[T]he   Jacoby   Declaration,   supplemented   by   the   Sealed   Jacoby  
Declaration   .   .   .   .   describes   in   broad   terms   the   intelligence-­‐‑gathering  
process   and   the   importance   of  maintaining   its   continuity   and   integrity.  
However,  the  principal  relevance  of  the  Jacoby  Declaration  to  the  issue  at  
hand—whether  Padilla   should  be  permitted   to   consult  with   counsel—is  
its   description   of   the   interrogation   techniques   used   by   the   [Defense  
Intelligence   Agency   (“DIA”)],   and   its   assessment   of   the   danger   of  
interrupting  such  interrogation  to  permit  Padilla  to  consult  with  counsel.  
The   Jacoby   Declaration   describes   as   follows   the   DIA’s   interrogation  
technique:  
“DIA’s   approach   to   interrogation   is   largely   dependent  
upon  creating  an  atmosphere  of  dependency  and  trust  between  
the   subject   and   the   interrogator.   Developing   the   kind   of  
relationship   of   trust   and   dependency   necessary   for   effective  
interrogations  is  a  process  that  can  take  a  significant  amount  of  
time.   There   are   numerous   examples   of   situations   where  
interrogators  have  been  unable   to  obtain  valuable   intelligence  
from   a   subject   until   months,   or   even   years,   after   the  
interrogation  process  began.  
Anything   that   threatens   the   perceived   dependency   and  
trust   between   the   subject   and   interrogator   directly   threatens  
the   value   of   interrogation   as   an   intelligence-­‐‑gathering   tool.  
Even   seemingly   minor   interruptions   can   have   profound  
psychological   impacts   on   the   delicate   subject-­‐‑interrogator  
relationship.   Any   insertion   of   counsel   into   the   subject-­‐‑
interrogator   relationship,   for   example—even   if   only   for   a  
limited  duration  or  for  a  specific  purpose—can  undo  months  of  
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Former  Judge  Mukasey,  to  his  credit,  disagreed.  However,  he  focused  
not  on  Padilla’s  citizenship  status  or  on  the  Sixth  Amendment  or  even  on  
due   process,   but   on   the   habeas   statute87   which   permitted   appointment   of  
counsel  if  “the  interests  of  justice  so  require.”  Judge  Mukasey  decided  that  
they   did   in   this   case.   To   be   sure,   Padilla’s   counsel   had   raised   a   Sixth  
Amendment   claim  on  his   behalf,   but   Judge  Mukasey   rejected   that   line  of  
reasoning  because  he  concluded  that  Padilla’s  case—after  his  designation—
was   not   technically   a   criminal   proceeding   anymore.88   Still,   in   apparent  
recognition   of   the   uncharted   nature   of   the   waters   in   which   he   found  
himself,  Judge  Mukasey  did  accept  that:  
[T]here   would   seem   to   be   no   reason   why   that   jurisprudence  
cannot   at   least   inform   the   exercise   of   discretion   here.  .  .  .  
Although   the   Sixth  Amendment  does   not   control   Padilla’s   case,  
  
work   and   may   permanently   shut   down   the   interrogation  
process.  Therefore,  it  is  critical  to  minimize  external  influences  
on  the  interrogation  process.”  
Padilla   ex   rel   Newman   v.   Rumsfeld,   243   F.   Supp.   2d   42,   49   (S.D.N.Y.   2003)   (quoting  
Declaration   of   Vice   Admiral   Lowell   E.   Jacoby   at   4-­‐‑5,   Padilla,   243   F.   Supp.   2d   at   42   (No.  
02CV04445),  2002  WL  34342502).  
  87    Padilla  233  F.  Supp.  at  600.  Judge  Mukasey  explained:    
The   habeas   corpus   statutes   do   not   explicitly   provide   a   right   to  
counsel   for   a   petitioner   in   Padilla’s   circumstances,   but   18   U.S.C.   §  
3006A(2)(B)   permits   a   court   to   which   a   §   2241   petition   is   addressed   to  
appoint   counsel   for   the   petitioner   if   the   court   determines   that   “the  
interests  of  justice  so  require.”    
Id.  (citing  18  U.S.C.  §  3006A(2)(B)  (2000)).  
  88    Id.  Judge  Mukasey  reasoned:  
  Of  course,  Padilla  has  no  Sixth  Amendment  right  to  counsel   in  this  
proceeding.  The  Sixth  Amendment  grants  that  right  to  the  “accused”  in  a  
“criminal   proceeding”;   Padilla   is   in   the   custody   of   the   Department   of  
Defense;   there   is  no  “criminal  proceeding”   in  which  Padilla   is  detained;  
therefore,   the   Sixth   Amendment   does   not   speak   to   Padilla’s   situation.  
Beyond   the   plain   language   of   the   Amendment,   “even   in   the   civilian  
community   a   proceeding   which   may   result   in   deprivation   of   liberty   is  
nonetheless  not   a   ‘criminal  proceeding’  within   the  meaning  of   the  Sixth  
Amendment  if  there  are  elements  about  it  which  sufficiently  distinguish  it  
from   a   traditional   civilian   criminal   trial.”   Such   “elements”   are   present  
here—notably,   that   Padilla’s   detention   “does   not   implicate   either   of   the  
two   primary   objectives   of   criminal   punishment:   retribution   or  
deterrence.”   Although   Escobedo   v.   Illinois,   .   .   .   recognized   a   Sixth  
Amendment   right   against   custodial   interrogation   without   access   to  
counsel,  the  remedy  for  violation  of  this  right  is  exclusion  of  the  fruits  of  
the   interrogation  at   a   criminal   trial.  There  being  no  criminal  proceeding  
here,  Padilla  could  not  enforce  this  right  now  even  if  he  had  it.  
Id.  at   600   (footnote   omitted)   (citations   omitted)   (quoting  Kansas  v.  Hendricks,   521  U.S.   346,  
361-­‐‑62  (1997);  Middendorf  v.  Henry,  425  U.S.  25,  38  (1976)).  
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the   logic   of   the  underlying   case   law   suggests   that   discretion  .  .  .  
should   be   exercised   in   favor   of   permitting   him   to   consult   with  
counsel  in  aid  of  his  petition  .  .  .  .89  
This   position   was   conceptually,   if   not   specifically,   vindicated   by   the  
Supreme  Court   in  Hamdi  v.  Rumsfeld,   in  which   the  Court  held   that   a  U.S.  
citizen   captured   on   the   battlefield   had   certain   due   process   protections.90  
Justice  O’Connor  did  not  write  at   length  on  Hamdi’s   right   to  an  attorney  
because,  by   the   time   the  Court   rendered   its  decision,  Hamdi  had  already  
been   granted   access   to   one.91   However,   O’Connor   did   write   that   Hamdi  
“unquestionably  has   the   right   to  access   to   counsel   in   connection  with   the  
proceedings  on  remand.”92  It  seems  clear  now  that  a  functionalist  model  of  
the   due   process   right   to   counsel   protects   U.S.   citizens   in   ambiguous  
proceedings.   The   implications   of  Wong  Wing   v.  United   States,93  Hamdan   v.  
Rumsfeld,94  and  Boumediene  v.  Bush,95  support  the  idea  that  the  same  should  
be   true   for   noncitizens,   at   least   if   they   are   held   on   U.S.   soil   or   at  
Guantánamo   Bay.   During   oral   argument   in   Padilla   v.   Kentucky,   this  
question   of   whether   due   process   mandated   counsel   (or   certain   judicial  
protections)   came   up,   at   least   obliquely.   The   opinion,   however,   avoids   it  
completely,  probably  for  the  same  “floodgates”  reasons  discussed  above.96  
But  nothing  in  the  opinion  focuses  on  the   individuals’   immigration  status  
as   a   determining   factor.   So   it   seems   that   such   status   is   now   arguably  
irrelevant  for  Sixth  Amendment  purposes  (and  thus,  presumably,  for  Fifth  
Amendment  purposes,  too).  
One  factor  clearly  still  seems  relevant:  territory.  We  need  to  consider  in  
detail  and  depth  why  and  to  what  extent  pre-­‐‑deportees  like  Jose  Padilla  have  
a   right   to   counsel,   but   under   current   law   post-­‐‑deportees   who   argue   that  
mistakes   were   made   in   their   cases   (including   Padilla-­‐‑type   misadvice)   do  
not  even  have  the  right  to  a  motion  to  reopen  in  order  to  raise  such  issues  
to  be  adjudicated.  But  this,  too,  is  a  task  for  another  day.  
  
  89    Id.  at  603.  
  90    542  U.S.  507,  539  (2004).  
  91    See  id.  at  512.  
  92    Id.  at  539.  
  93    163  U.S.  228  (1896)  (holding  that  noncitizens  have  constitutional  rights  when  criminally  
prosecuted).  
  94    548  U.S.  557  (2006)  (finding  that  the  military  commission  convened  to  try  the  petitioner  
lacked  the  power  to  proceed  because  its  structure  and  procedures  violated  the  Uniform  Code  
of  Military  Justice  and  the  Geneva  Conventions).  
  95    553   U.S.   723   (2008)   (holding   that   Guantánamo   Bay   detainees   have   the   constitutional  
privilege  of  habeas  corpus).  
  96    See  supra  Part  III.A.  
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CONCLUSION  
Padilla  v.  Kentucky,  read  broadly,  has  many  positive  attributes  but  also  
has  many  gaps  in  its  reasoning.  Indeed,  it  may  even  have  opened  the  door  
to   right-­‐‑to-­‐‑counsel   claims   in   deportation   proceedings.   If   that   is   so,   then  
Matter  of  Compean97   (ironically  also  written  by   the  same  Michael  Mukasey  
who   had   presided   over   alleged   enemy   combatant   Jose   Padilla’s  
proceedings   in   New   York)   was   not   just   a   little   bit   wrong,   but  
fundamentally   so.   However,   the   following   excerpts   from   the  Padilla   oral  
argument  might  give  pause  if  the  Compean  question  ever  gets  to  the  Court:  
CHIEF   JUSTICE  ROBERTS:   I   think  when  we—when  we   decide  
there’s   no   right   to   counsel,   like   on   collateral   review,   we   don’t  
even   look   at   what   happened,   right?   We   don’t   look   and   see  
whether  the  advice  was  ineffective,  how  bad  the  lawyer  was.  The  
idea  is  if  you  don’t  have  the  right  at  all,  you  don’t  have  the  right  
to  an  effective  lawyer.  
MR.  DREEBEN:  That’s  right.  
CHIEF  JUSTICE  ROBERTS:  Is  that  right?  Okay.  98  
So   does   Padilla   v.   Kentucky   mean   that   deportation   is/may   be  
punishment  for  constitutional  purposes?  It   is  hard  to  say.  As  noted,  some  
have  called  the  case  “our”  Gideon  v.  Wainwright.99  I  would  like  to  think  this  
is   so,   but   I   do   not—it   has   simply   left   too   many   questions   unanswered.  
Gideon,  of  course,  closed  the  circle  that  had  been  opened  by  the  “Scotsboro  
Boys”  case—Powell  v.  Alabama100   and   then  widened  by  Betts  v.  Brady.101   In  
those   cases   the   Court   opened   the   courthouse   door—interestingly   with  
  
  97    24   I.   &  N.  Dec.   710,   714   (Att’y  Gen.   2009),   vacated   25   I.   &  N.  Dec.   1   (Att’y  Gen.   2009)  
(concluding   that   because   there   was   no   constitutional   right   to   counsel   in   deportation  
proceedings   the  Attorney  General  could  craft  a  new,  stricter   framework   for   reopening  cases  
based  on  claims  of  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel).  
  98    Transcript   of   Oral   Argument,   supra   note   57,   at   21-­‐‑22.   Then,   Justice   Roberts   continues:  
“Well,   these–when  you  are   talking  about   collateral   consequences,   you  don’t  have   a   right   to  
counsel  on–with  respect  to  those  collateral  consequences.  I  assume  there’s–maybe  there  is–is  
there  a  right  to  counsel  when  you  are  facing  a  deportation  proceeding?”  Id.  He  is  assured  that  
there  is  not  and  then  he  asks:  “Well,  then,  if  there  is  no  right  to  counsel,  why  do  we  get  into  
whether  there  is  an  affirmative  misrepresentation  or  not?”  Id.  
  99    372  U.S.  335  (1963).  
  100    287  U.S.  45  (1932)  (finding  that  failure  to  give  “ignorant  and  illiterate  youth”  reasonable  
time  and  opportunity   to  secure  counsel  prior   to   trial   for  a  crime  punishable  by  death,  while  
keeping   them   away   from   family   and   friends   and   closely   confined   under   military   guard  
violated  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment).  
  101    316   U.S.   455   (1942)(holding   that   because   the   Sixth   Amendment   right   to   counsel   only  
applied   to   federal   courts   and   that   the   Fourteenth   Amendment   did   not   incorporate   that  
guarantee,  there  was  no  right  to  state-­‐‑appointed  counsel  in  every  case  in  which  a  defendant,  
charged  with  a  crime,  was  unable  to  obtain  counsel).  
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qualifications   very   much   like   those   in   Padilla—to   some   claims   that   state  
courts  had  to  incorporate  Sixth  Amendment  norms  in  certain  types  of  cases.  
The   “special   circumstances”   doctrine—as   it   was   then   called—was   so  
unstable  that  it  eventually  yielded  to  the  full,  bright-­‐‑line  version  in  Gideon;  
that   is  why  most  criminal  defendants   today  have  a  constitutional   right   to  
counsel.  
So  if  Padilla  is  anything  analogous  to  the  Gideon  line,  it  is  perhaps  more  
like  Powell  v.  Alabama  or  Betts  v.  Brady.  Too  many  special  circumstances  and  
gaps  remain  to  call  it  “our”  Gideon.  The  task  now  is  to  reconcile  this  good-­‐‑
hearted   but   somewhat   confused   and   uneasy   opinion   with   its   better  
conceptual  underpinnings.  This  will  require:  
1. A  functionalist  model  of  the  Sixth  Amendment  taken  seriously  as  
applied  to  deportation,  whether  as  part  of  the  criminal  process  or  
outside  of  it;  or  
2. A  more   expansive   understanding   of   due   process   that   does   not  
require   a   case-­‐‑by-­‐‑case   showing   of   the   need   for   counsel   in  
deportation  cases.  
The   key   should   not   be   the   “automatic”   aspect   of   certain   types   of  
deportation   but   deportation’s   prevalence,   harshness,   complexity,   lack   of  
proportionality,  effects  on  families  and  children,  etc.  Such  thinking  takes  us  
a   lot   further   than  does  Padilla  v.  Kentucky,  but   it   follows   logically   from  its  
underlying  premises.   If   the  courts  were   to   follow  this  approach  (though  I  
fear  that  the  opposite  is  more  likely)  then  the  case  will  be  much  more  than  
Justice   Stevens’s   last   hurrah.   This—like   so   many   other   interesting   legal  
issues  these  days—seems  to  depend  upon  the  vote  of  Justice  Kennedy.  So  
perhaps,  as  to  such  crucial  questions  as  whether  the  case  should  be  read  to  
apply   to   past   deportation   cases   and   in   the   post-­‐‑deportation   context,   we  
should  look  to  Boumediene  and  the  critical  idea  that  questions  such  as  these  
ought   to   “turn   on   objective   factors   and   practical   concerns,   not  
formalism.”102  Stay  tuned.  
  
  102    Boumediene  v.  Bush,  553  U.S.  723,  764  (2008).  
